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CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC
FINANCE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
RESPONSE TO JEROME LEVINSON
Bruce Rich*
I agree with Jerome Levinson on several major points. However, I
have some questions that I would like to address in order to elucidate
some issues. I will then confront one point with which I do not com-
pletely agree, namely the degree of accountability of the multilateral
banks; Mr. Levinson's view is that there is a very precise structural
hierarchy of accountability from the staff and management to the exec-
utive directors, governors, national legislatures and parliaments.
The observation that the social question, the political question, and
the human rights question should be incorporated into the operational
criteria of the multilateral development banks is something I agree
with wholeheartedly. However, I am uncertain of the political likeli-
hood and feasibility of amending the charters of agreement. As
Ibrahim Shihata pointed out, amending the Articles of Agreement of
the multilateral development banks requires the approval of three-fifths
of the member countries, that together must hold at least eighty-five
percent of the votes.' This arrangement gives the United States veto
power. It gives a small coalition of European countries veto power. It
also gives veto power to any number of possible coalitions of developing
borrower countries. Even in this new world order where democracy,
participation and governance are politically popular issues, I must
question the likelihood of obtaining a consensus sufficient to change the
charter pursuant to such a plan. Similarly, amending the Inter-Ameri-
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1. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMEN-r ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT art. VIII (as amended Feb. 16, 1989). The World Bank consists of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International De-
velopment Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 1991 WORLD BASK ANN.
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can Development Bank Charter requires approval by two-thirds of the
members, holding at least three-fourths of the voting power.
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Second, the question of access to information is the critical corollary
of these concerns over human rights, governance and social issues. It
will remain the predominant consideration so long as these multilateral
institutions do not freely share information regarding their activities
with the public, the developing countries, the donor countries and the
executive directors. This lack of disclosure is an important point that
many people are not aware of.
For example, in 1991, the United States Executive Director of the
World Bank was denied access to a draft appraisal report six weeks
before he was to vote on an $80 million forestry loan, Also, the largest
shareholders are unable to gain access to 90 percent of the information
in the project files for the institutions they finance.
Mr. Shihata has not satisfactorily addressed this issue. I am not con-
cerned with the general reasons given by the World Bank staff for
withholding information; they may have genuinely believed it to be a
good idea. Rather, I would like the World Bank staff to cite legal justi-
fication, from the Articles of Agreement for example, for withholding
most project information from the Executive Directors.
The nature of this informational problem can be seen by reference to
an example. In the mid-1980s, the Environmental Defense Fund
worked with other environmental groups to obtain information from the
World Bank regarding projects financed by the Bank in Brazil. Robert
W. Kasten, Jr., then Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Foreign
Operations Sub-Committee, sent a letter to the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, Donald Regan,3 stating that the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee was very concerned about the environmental issues involved in
World Bank projects. The letter requested that the Bank give the Trea-
sury Department access to the project files for a large road-building
and agricultural colonization scheme in Brazil financed by the Bank.
The letter also requested access to all project files between 1979 and
1982 concerning the environment and Indian populations, and all office
supervision reports produced by the Bank from 1979 through 1984. Of
course, we already knew what was in these files - we had them. The
files showed that World Bank anthropologists warned that the project
would result in genocide of the Indians and massive deforestation. The
2. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IX.
3. Letter from Robert W. Kasten, Jr., to the Hon. Donald T. Regan (Jan. 23,
1985) (on file with the author and with The American University Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy).
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documents also revealed evidence that World Bank soil specialists dis-
covered that there was insufficient information regarding the soils.
There were memoranda from World Bank agricultural experts stating
that this project seemed to be the most uneconomical agricultural pro-
ject in Brazil. Other members of the World Bank staff stated that the
project would proceed as planned despite these problems, and indicated
their hope that senior management in the Bank would stop raising
these issues, preferring, instead, to deal with them at the working level.
The World Bank management refused to deliver the documents,
causing some consternation within the Treasury Department and their
legal department because the Environmental Defense Fund and other
environmental groups were rocking the boat. The Treasury Department
took a position similar to that of the Bank, stating that they did not
favor the Senate Appropriations Committee rifling through the files of
the World Bank. Treasury officials cited a provision in the Bank's char-
ter which states that the archives of the Bank are inviolable.' This re-
sponse from the World Bank and the Treasury upset the Senate, which
felt that its role in appropriating money for the Bank entitled it to
know the nature of projects undertaken, and has continued to cause
friction between Congress and the Treasury Department.5
One reason the Bank often cites for not sharing information is the
confidential relationship between the Bank and borrowing govern-
ments.6 Jerome Levinson also cites confidentiality as a plausible reason.
In the mid-1980s, two national United States environmental groups,
the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club, grew con-
cerned about World Bank live stock lending to Botswana and the envi-
ronmental implications of such a project. In 1987, the two groups re-
quested copies of consultant reports, commissioned by the Bank,
containing information on the environmental impact of the project. The
Bank refused to provide the documents. Subsequently, representatives
of the environmental organizations traveled to Botswana, met with gov-
ernment officials, and came back with a letter from the Botswana gov-
4. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ARTICLES OF
AGREEMENT, art. VII, sec. 5. Section 7 of article VII also provides that official commu-
nications of the Bank shall be accorded the same privileged treatment that the host
country affords communications of member nations. Id. art. VII, sec. 7.
5. See JONATHAN E. SANFORD, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MULTILATERAL DEVEL-
OPMENT BANKS 132 (1982) (describing the tension between Congress and development
banks over access to information). See also id. at 147-52 (describing the tension be-
tween Congress and the executive branch regarding access to information and
supremacy in foreign policy).
6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing the Bank's Articles of Agree-
ment as protecting this confidentiality).
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ernment stating that the reports should soon be released to the public.
The groups repeated their request again in late 1987 with the letter
from the Botswana government. Yet, for more than a year the Bank
refused to release the documents. Not until late in 1988 were the docu-
ments finally released without any explanation for the delay, apart
from bureaucratic whim. Informally, the Bank indicated that it was
probably due to staff in the Bank's Legal Department who were con-
cerned with the precedent that would be set despite Botswana's desire
to release the documents. This example clearly illustrates that there is
a real and significant problem regarding access to information.
Finally, I agree with Jerome Levinson that, in theory, there exists a
structural hierarchy of accountability. However, I disagree with the no-
tion that this hierarchy of accountability works well in practice. The
examples I have cited illustrate the day-to-day reality. Many other fac-
tors make it extremely difficult for the executive directors and their
small staffs to accurately evaluate and deal with the information that is
presented to them. In reality, they have very little time to make their
decisions. An average project in the World Bank might take two to
three years to prepare. A loan for a hundred million dollars could in-
volve thousands of pages of documents.7 Yet the executive directors re-
ceive the final appraisal report just thirteen working days before the
deadline for their final decision to approve or reject the project. This
extraordinary amount of information caused the United States execu-
tive director, in January of 1990, to request six weeks, instead of thir-
teen days, to study one controversial loan. The United States has an
advantage in reviewing this information because its government is in
Washington. For Japan and major donor countries in Western Europe
thirteen days is insufficient to adequately review the projects.
Under current practice, the only method for securing adequate re-
view occurs in the exceptional cases when non-governmental groups
bring additional information forward at the last moment. In one case,
the Environmental Defense Fund obtained a copy of a draft appraisal
report and provided copies to the Treasury Department and the United
States Executive Director after the Bank refused access. This exempli-
fies the grotesque situation surrounding approval of these projects.
7. See generally WARREN C. BAuM, THE PROJECT CYCLE (1991) (describing the
lengthy process of obtaining a loan from the World Bank and implementing a project).
Baum, Vice President of Operations Policy for the Bank, divides the project cycle into
several phases: identification of suitable projects; preparation of the proposal (a two-
year process); appraisal by the Bank of technical, institutional, economic and financial
aspects of the project; negotiations and board presentations; implementation and super-
vision; and evaluation. Id.
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It will be more difficult to achieve development successes in human
rights through interpretation of the Bank's Articles of Agreement and
through amendment than it is in the environmental arena. This is be-
cause the environmental arena is a more neutral political issue than
human rights. Environmental issues are technical, with direct and indi-
rect bearing on the economic performance of projects. This permits the
advancement of environmental causes without requiring redress of the
political, informational and other restrictions contained in the Articles
of Agreement of the multilateral development banks. In contrast,
human rights issues are politically charged, allowing no neutral mecha-
nisms, such as economic or environmental analysis, for resolution.
